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Business Identity Theft under the UDRP and the ACPA:  
Is bad faith always bad for business advertising? 
Bukola Faturoti*  
Abstract: Websites have provided a very strong platform for businesses to reach 
their customers. They surpass the regular billboards by providing portals through which 
transactions are conducted without any physical contacts between a seller and a buyer. This 
usefulness underscores the importance of domain names through which websites are 
navigated. Cybersquatters have in bad faith targeted or hijacked domain names of famous 
and reputable businesses exploiting the goodwill of these names and misleading customers 
and other internet users. This paper explores the construction of bad faith under both the 
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy and the US Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act. The paper argues that, despite some inconsistencies, “bad faith” elements have been 
broadly interpreted to embrace various activities of cybersquatters. It cautions that an 
overzealous application of the instruments may stifle freedom of speech. 
1. Introduction 
Since the commercialization of the internet, websites have assumed the role of billboards as a medium 
through which commercial ventures, from large to small scale, use in signposting their products, contacts, 
as well as their standard operating procedures, to the general public. In comparison however, a website is 
a more powerful marketing tool than the traditional billboard. Whilst traditional billboards merely provide 
basic information about businesses, are stationary, the websites do provide ‘on-the-spot’ transactional and 
communication facilities such as mailing tools, links to specific information, and other flexibilities,  
websites provide a wider range of flexibilities as transactions can be initiated, facilitated, and completed 
using its tools without physical contacts between the seller and the buyer. Private individuals have also 
used websites to promote their images and disseminate autobiographical information. The gateway to 
companies or individuals’ websites is a unique “Universal Resource Locator” (URL). A “URL” identifies 
the physical location of a website in the internet’s infrastructure.  A core element of a URL is a domain 
name. Domain names consist of the words and characters that websites owners designate for their 
registered internet addresses. 
Domain names are corporate assets. Businesses do not string random words to generate their 
URLs. Some business owners use business names or certain combinations of words which are already 
known to their customers.1  In other words, businesses, institutions, and individuals use domain names to 
identify themselves since they are easy to remember and create and easily attract consumers to their 
website. Markedly, domain names have the semblance of trade marks in real world. However, there is a 
fundamental difference. While a trademark identifies the source of goods in commerce, a domain name 
does not generally appear on goods as an indication of source.2    
While domain name of a business carries the goodwill of the business, it is susceptible to theft, and 
this means theft of the companies identity or goodwill. Theft of goodwill can occur whereby a person 
exploits the goodwill of another by deceiving or confusing unsuspecting internet users into believing that 
the business concerned actually belong to him. The unauthorised exploitation of famous and distinctive 
domain names is regarded as bad faith in trademark and cybersquatting disputes. Both the Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) and the US Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) 
                                               
*Senior Lecturer. The author is gratefully thankful to Prof. Ken Mackinnon, Dr. Olasupo Owoeye, Ernest Enobun 
and Dolapo Tade for their comments and invaluable feedbacks. Any other errors remain mine. 
1 Frederick M. Abbott ‘On the Duality of Internet Domain Names: Propertization And Its Discontents” (2013) 3 NYU 
J. Intell. Prop. & Ent. L. 1- 52. 
2 WIPO, “The Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues, Report of the WIPO 
Internet Domain Name Process” WIPO Pub. No.439 at paras. 163-77. 
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1999 contain guidelines in ensuring consistency in finding and interpretation of “bad faith” or “bad faith 
intent to profit”. However judicial constructions have varied from a very broad interpretation of these 
guidelines to a very narrow one. This paper explores the interpretation of bad faith in the use of domain 
names. It seeks to answer the questions of: When does the use of a domain name become a commercial 
use? Is harsh criticism of a business an act of bad faith? What is the threshold for good faith? The first 
part examines the nature of domain names and its importance to businesses. Part II focuses on critical 
examination of bad faith.  Part III traces the thin line between good faith and bad faith. 
 
2. The Interest in a Domain Name and Cybersquatting 
Domain names share the same characteristics with traditional forms of business identifiers -trademarks, 
service marks and trade names though they may not necessarily identify a producer or supplier of goods 
by its location on the internet. The usefulness of domain names exposes business owners to business 
identity theft. The implication of such exposure is similar to what individuals suffer when they have their 
identity impersonated or stolen. The effects of identity theft range from negative credit rating to loss of 
businesses and in the extreme causing damage to business reputation and liability for any injury suffered 
by a third party.3    
The characterisation of a domain name as ‘property’ has lingered on as a topical issue, but there is 
no consensus on the nature of domain names as a property.  It was held that domain names are not a 
property but a product of a service contract between the registrar and the domain name registrant.4   
Thereby implying it only vests a contractual right to use a unique domain name for a specified period of 
time on the registrant. Conversely in Kremen v. Cohen5 it was concluded that domain names are 
intangible property because they satisfy the three-part test for establishing the existence of a property 
right which are: an interest capable of a precise definition; capable of exclusive possession or control; and 
capable of giving rise to a legitimate claim for exclusivity.  This decision has been argued to be flawed 
for being both under-inclusive and over-inclusive6.  It has been argued to be under inclusive because the 
court fails “to recognize and consider the substantive role of property in establishing the structures of 
social organization, including, but not limited to, those such as jurisdictional or choice of law rules.7”  On 
the other hand it is seen to be over-inclusive because if domain names are deemed as intangible property 
based on exclusivity, this would expand the scope of property to such resources like those of intellectual 
property and discretionary benefits awarded by contract.  
Irrespective of this uncertainty, the use of domain names creates problems such as its economic 
importance to their owners. First, the name must be unique but they are limited. Second, their registration 
has always been based on a first come, first service basis. Before 2011, only 22 suffixes were available 
for websites. Between October 2013 and February 2014, over 150 new top-level domains have been 
added but this has not forestalled the problem of cybersquatting.  
Litman identifies three categories of cybersquatters.8  The first category of cybersquatters registers 
unused but commercially viable domain names with the intention of selling them to business owners for 
substantial sum. In practice, series of common surnames are hijacked with the intention of selling to 
individuals who wanted to use their surnames as domain names. The second category of cybersquatters is 
squatters who genuinely wanted to help companies and business ventures build online presence when 
they are setting up businesses. Finally there are others who register unrelated domain names as porn sites 
as a way of enticing genuine information seekers. Activities of cybersquatters recognised by the US 
Senate include: registration of well-known brand names as internet domain names with the intention to 
extract payment from the rightful owners of the marks; warehousing of well known domain names with 
                                               
3 Michael Servian ‘Help! Someone’s squatting ion my brand – cybersquatting’ Computer and Telecommunications 
Law Review 2013 19 (3) 92-93 
4 Network Solutions Inc v Umbro Intern., Inc 529 S.E. 2D 80 (Va 2000) 
5 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) 
6 Noah M. Schottenstein “Of Process and Product: Kremen v. Cohen and the Consequences of Recognizing Property 
Rights in Domain Names” Virginia Journal of Law & Technology 2009 Vol. 14, No. 1 
7 Ibid pg 3 
8 Jessica Litman ‘The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name System’ 4 J Small  & Emerging 
Business L. 149 (2000) 
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the intention of selling them to highest bidder; and misleading and diversion of customers to 
cybersquatter’s own site.9  
In 2010, trademark holders filed 2,696 cybersquatting cases covering 4,370 domain names with 
the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Centre10.  This constitutes an increase of over 28% of the number of 
cases resolved in 200911.  Top affected business areas are retail, banking and finance, biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals, Internet and IT and fashion12.  
 
3. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers13 (ICANN) is a coalition of internet’s business, 
non-commercial, technical and academic communities. ICANN was a creation of the US government in 
1998 with the oversight of certain tasks relating to the assignment of domain names and IP addresses. 
ICANN replaced Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) in response among others to widespread 
conflicts between trademark holders and domain name holders. Among others, the organisation is 
dedicated “to preserving the operational stability of the Internet; and to developing a policy appropriate to 
its mission through bottom-up, consensus-based processes”.14 ICANN maintains a list of accredited 
registrars who are saddled with registering top level domain and currently has 1,130 registrars on its 
register. 
Part of the mandates of ICANN was to provide a fast and inexpensive mechanism to resolve 
domain name disputes. The usual forum for a dispute of this nature would be national courts but many of 
these courts lack the ability to handle internet-related dispute.  In 1999 ICANN approved the Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) to be followed by its accredited registrars. The current version of the 
policy was adopted on 30 October 2009. Its earlier version applies to all complaints submitted to a 
provider on or before 28 February 2010.15 In addition to setting the ground rules for dispute resolution, 
the policy immunes and excludes ICANN and anybody acting on its behalf from any legal proceedings.16 
 
4. Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) 
The UDRP forms part of the domain name Registration Agreement and governs proceedings of dispute 
arising from the disputes between the registrant and any complaining third party excluding ICANN and 
any of its agents17.   The UDRP offers a different kind of arbitral process because parties can have 
recourse against “the award” in a national court or litigate the case de novo. In fact, the UDRP lacks the 
requisite agreement to arbitrate.  
ICANN has five functional dispute resolution service providers18 namely the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO)19, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF)20 and the Asian Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Centre (ADNDRC)21.  Others are Czech Arbitration Court – Arbitration Centre for 
Internet Disputes22 and Arab Centre for Domain Names Dispute Resolution23.  Each of these providers is 
                                               
9 Senate Report  No. 106-140 at 5-6 available at 
http://www.dmlp.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/ACPA%20leg%20history.pdf accessed on 20 July 2014 
10 World Intellectual Property Organisation ‘Cybersquatting Hits Record Level, WIPO Centre Rolls out New 
Services’ available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2011/article_0010.html accessed on 20 July 2014 
11 http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2011/article_0010.html accessed on 20 July 2014 
12 http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2011/article_0010.html#annex3 accessed on 20 July 2014 
13 Murray A.D.; The Regulations of Cyberspace: Control in the Online Environment, (Routledge-Cavendish)  2007 
p.107 
14 ibid 
15 https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/rules-be-2012-02-25-en Accessed on 31 July 2014  
16 The effect of this provision is to limit the relationship between a registrant and the registrar or ICANN to that of 
contract only.  
17 https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en Accessed on 31 July 2014 
18 http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm 
19Approved in 1999, WIPO is the largest global dispute resolution service provider. 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics/cases.jsp  
20 NAF was approved as provider on 23 December 1999. It is acclaimed to be the largest dispute resolution service 
provider in North America. http://www.adrforum.com/ 
21http://www.adndrc.org/adndrc/index.html  
22http://www.adr.eu/index.php The Czech Arbitration Court was appointed in January 2008 as the fourth international 
provider of UDRP services.   
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required to follow the rules under UDRP and any supplemental rules it may have designed to carry out its 
duties.  
Registrants are subject to a strict liability rule like that found under common law of torts. All 
prospective registrants and those renewing a domain name must prove that (a) the statements they made 
are true and accurate (b) the registration does not infringe the right of third party (c) the registration is 
lawful and (d) the domain name will not be knowingly used in violation of applicable laws or 
regulations.24   
The respondent, an ICANN customer, is mandated to submit to ICANN’s jurisdiction when there 
is a complaint from a third party.  Although this jurisdiction is contractual, it permits a registrant who is 
accused of cybersquatting to commence a fresh proceeding at a court of competent jurisdiction.25  The 
new policy, unlike the old, is silent on the effect of such proceedings. The old policy allowed the 
Administrative Panel the discretion to suspend or terminate the administrative proceeding, or to proceed 
to a decision.26  It is argued that an action in the court would serve as a stay of ICANN’s panel 
proceedings except where the court on its own refuses jurisdiction.27  This would otherwise lead to 
multiple decisions that could create the problem of enforcement for ICANN where the decisions are 
conflicting. Either party can appeal the decision of the panel to a national court if the outcome is 
perceived not to be favourable. The court is likewise not mandated to give any weight to the earlier 
decision of the panel.28 
 
4.1 Finding Bad Faith 
To file a complaint, a victim of cybersquatting could invoke the ICANN mandatory administrative 
proceeding under the heads of claim provided for in paragraph 4(a) that (i) the registrant’s domain name 
is identical or confusingly similar to a mark in which he has right; (ii) the registrant does not have 
legitimate interest in respect of the domain name; and (iii) the domain name has been registered and being 
use in bad faith.29 The policy does not provide a definition for “bad faith” for the purpose of paragraph 
4(a)(iii) but it adds four non-exclusive circumstances evidencing “bad faith” namely: (i) the respondent 
registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling to the complainant or complainant’s 
competitor for a value more than documented out-of-pocket costs; (ii) the respondent registered the 
domain name in order to prevent the owner of the mark from using it and has engaged in a pattern of such 
conduct; (iii) the respondent registered the domain name for the purpose of disrupting the business of a 
competitor; and (iv) by using the domain name, the respondent  has intentionally attempted to attract 
users for commercial gain by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark.  
These circumstances show that ‘bad faith’ means more than being dishonest. It includes “some 
dealings which fall short of the standards of acceptable commercial behaviour observed by reasonable 
and experienced men in the particular area being examined.”30 The UDRP’s “bad faith” guidelines are 
consistent with consensus in common law countries and also at OHIM (the European Union Trade Marks 
and Designs Registry).31 
 
4.1.1  Bad faith Registration and Use  
The UDRP requires that proof of registration of domain name in ‘bad faith’ must be followed by proof 
that it was also used in bad faith. In other words, it requires a complainant to prove that the domain name 
in question was registered and used in bad faith, rather than simply registered or used in bad faith. Bad 
                                                                                                                                         
23http://acdr.aipmas.org/default.aspx?lang=en   
Approved as a Dispute Resolution Service provider by ICANN on 18 May 2013.   
24 ibid 
25 Paragraph 4(k) UDRP https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en 
26 https://archive.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules-24oct99-en.htm accessed 31 July 2014 
27 Weber-Stephen Products Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Building Supply, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6335 (N.D. Ill. 
2000) 
28 ibid 
29 Note 11 at para 4 
30 per Mr. Justice Arnold in Hotel Cipriani SRL and others v Cipriani (Grosvenor Street) Ltd and Others [2009] Bus 
LR D81 
31 WIPO Case No. D2008-1531 
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faith registration can be easily identified when circumscribed within the enumerated circumstances but 
becomes more difficult when the panels apply other instances not expressly stated in the policy.  A bad 
faith registration cannot be retrospectively implied. In Nattermann & Cie. GmbH and Sanofi-aventis v. 
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.32 the primary purpose of the registration was to promote the products of the 
complainant though there was a subsequent bad faith use. In the opinion of the panel, any importation of 
''retroactive bad faith registration'' would only widen the language of paragraph 4(a)(iii) beyond the one 
contemplated by its drafters. Therefore bad faith registration could be inferred where an offer for sale was 
made shortly after the registration of a domain name, or if the respondent lacked credible reason for the 
registration. On the contrary in Octogen Pharmacal Company, Inc. v. Domains By Proxy, Inc./Rich 
Sanders and Octogen e-Solutions33  it was held that a party can register or acquire a domain name in good 
faith, yet use the domain name in the future in such a way that the representations and warranties that the 
registrant made as of the time of registration are violated.34  
Registration of a domain name with the sole aim of offering it for sale would constitute bad faith.35 
The respondent has not put the domain "toefl.com" to any use apart from offering to sell it. The panel 
inferred bad registration from bad use stating that, “if the respondent’s offer for sale is determined to be in 
bad faith, the registration will also be deemed to be in bad faith.”36  This author agrees that bad faith 
registration and use is a unitary concept and should not be separated because bad faith registration could 
be better deduced by examining the subsequent conduct or the form of use to the registrant has put the 
domain name.  
Again, what constitutes “use” has also been shrouded in uncertainty. It may be argued that “use” 
denotes an active activity by the registrant. Withholding or hoarding which prevents the complainants 
from making use of the domain name is a passive act in bad faith.37 The concept of a domain name "being 
used in bad faith" is not limited to positive action but entails “inaction”. 38 
 
4.2  Circumstances Evidencing Bad Faith  
 
4.2.1 Intent to sell to the mark owner or competitor 
The panel must consider three things under this head: the intent of the registrant at the point of 
registration; the buyer approached by the registrant and the price offered to a prospective buyer.  If a 
registrant has a legitimate interest at the time of registration, the subsequent offer to sell would exclude 
bad faith. An earlier contractual agreement between parties which shows that they both benefited from the 
use of the domain negates the allegation that the primary intent was to sell.39 It would appear that if that 
where a respondent offer to sell the domain name for a mutually agreeable price, this will not suggest bad 
faith.40 However the decision in Biofield Corp v Kwon suggests the contrary.41  Intent to sell could also be 
inferred where registrant fails to employ the domain name for any purpose and could not establish any 
legitimate interest behind the registration.   
Offering a domain name for sale to somebody with apparent legitimate interest or the competitor 
of a mark owner would suggest bad faith. An offer made to the general public rather than the mark owner 
or its competitors would still amount to bad faith.42  The panel in www.dodialfayed.com inferred that the 
mark owner is the targeted purchaser considering the asking price by the respondent.43  
There is no guideline on what amounts to “excess of out-of-pocket expenses.”  Is there a particular 
ratio of profit which commercial registrants are only expected to make? The respondent in Biofield has 
requested for $1,000 while the respondent in the dodialfayed.com requested for $400,000.44 Many 
                                               
32WIPO Case No. D2010-0800   
33 WIPO Case No. D2009-0786 
34 Ibid. 
35WIPO Case No D2000-0044  
36 Ibid  
37 WIPO Case No. D2000-0003  
38 Ibid  
39 Nattermann & Cie. GmbH and Sanofi-aventis 
40 WIPO Case No. D2000-0046 
41 Case No AF-0102 available at http://www.disputes.org/decisions/0102.htm accessed 15 August 2014 
42 WIPO Case No. D2000-0044 
43 WIPO Case No.  D2000-0060   
44 ibid  
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registrants’ demands have been influenced by the fame of the mark or the financial clout of the mark 
owner.  In deciding whether the amount demanded is in excess, panels have always looked at other facts 
surrounding the complaints and not just the amount itself.  
 
4.2.2 A bad faith pattern of registration 
The registrant must have aimed to prevent an access to use the mark by the mark owner and must have 
engaged in a pattern of such conduct.  What happens if the respondent argues that he is not aware of the 
existence of any third party interest and have no ground for believing to the contrary when the mark was 
registered? It would appear that this would require an actual knowledge of the existence of the mark 
owner or the likely existence. Some panels have concluded that there was no requisite bad faith when 
respondents lacked knowledge of complainant’s mark during registration.45  
Another problematic aspect of this guideline is the issue of what constitutes “pattern”. In the 
context of the URDP policy, pattern would suggest something showing consistency in its occurrence. 
Does it require the complainant to prove that the respondent has engaged in similar acts in the past? 
Adducing such evidence would be of help in establishing bad faith but may impose onerous burden on the 
complainant in finding other victims of the respondents’ registrations. Again, is there a required number 
of domain names that must be registered before bad faith could be inferred? The use of 25 of the disputed 
domain names to intentionally attract internet users supports a finding of a pattern in Nobis Inc. v. 
Organization46. A panel refused to be persuaded that the registration of three very similar or identical 
domain names met the requirement of "pattern of conduct".47 Elsewhere another panel conversely held 
that the failure of respondents to use any of the three marks would be sufficient to infer that a pattern of 
conduct exists.48 Instead of limiting their consideration to the number of domain names registered, panels 
often direct themselves to other conducts of the registrants such as whether a false contact details have 
been provided, whether the petition is defended and the extent of similarity between marks and registered 
names.49  
 
4.2.3 Registered primarily to disrupt a competitor’s business 
Businesses do compete with each other and in extreme cases may engage in restrictive practices which 
are outlawed. Registering a domain name with a primary intention of disrupting a competitor’s business 
evidences bad faith. “Competitor’” has been differently interpreted by panels. It was held that the term 
"competitor" should not be restricted to a commercial or business competitor but encompasses a person 
who acts in opposition to another.50 It is not mandatory that the competition referred to should be 
commercial; the respondent's opposition to the practices of a broker, of which he was previously a 
customer and which he criticized, was sufficient to qualify him as a competitor.51  A restrictive view was 
preferred in Tribeca Film Center, Inc. v. Lorenzo Brusasco-Mackenzie,52 where it was held that a 
respondent can disrupt the business of a "competitor" only if he offers goods or services that can compete 
or rivals with the goods or services offered by the trademark owner. This restrictive reading may be a tool 
to stifle freedom of speech as seen in the cases decided under ACPA as honest grippers and those who 
suffered from bad customer services are prevented from voicing out their grievances. Some panels have 
therefore applied paragraph 4(b)(iii) to instances when the respondent has diverted traffics to the website 
of the complainant’s competitors.53  
 
4.2.4 Creating confusion with a mark with intent to attract users for commercial gain 
                                               
45 WIPO Case No. D2000-1299 
46 WIPO Case No. D2014-0068  
47 WIPO Case No D2000-002 
48 WIPO Case No. D2000-56   
49 WIPO Case No. D2014-0029   
50 WIPO Case No. D2000-0279   
51 WIPO Case No. D2000-1571  
52 WIPO Case No. D2000-1772  
53 WIPO Case No. D 2000-0024 
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This last arm, in tandem with traditional trademark laws, underscores an instance where the respondent 
has intentionally created confusion with the mark in order to attract internet users for commercial gains.  
It requires the panel to look at the intention of a respondent when making its decisions. Impliedly, there 
may be instances where there can be similarly confusing marks which were not borne out of deliberate 
acts of wanting to confuse consumers or attract users. A deliberate act to create confusion and make 
commercial gains was found in TRW Inc. v. Autoscan Inc.54 To the panel, the lines of business of both 
parties are sufficiently close, and a likelihood of confusion would be created among internet users by 
respondent’s use of complainant’s trademark in a substantially similar domain name. Similarly where a 
respondent has not only registered identical or confusingly similar domain names but also used the 
complainant’s distinctive logo and framing the content of the complainant’s website, it was not difficult 
to infer that the respondents aim was to create confusion and profit from such act.55  No evidence of profit 
is needed. What is important is that the respondent must have attempted to profit from the established 
goodwill of the complainant. 
 
5.   Pre ACPA 
Under the US Federal Trade Mark Act 1946, usages that could cause confusion, mistake or deception 
constitute the breach of the mark owner’s rights but novelty surrounding the use of internet for business 
marketing exposed the inability of this Act to protect cybersquatters’ victims. Trademark focuses on 
likelihood of confusion while dilution protects famous marks. A plaintiff under this action must prove 
that a “commercial use” of the mark has been undertaken56 but some cybersquatters do not actually do 
this. Some courts had to embark on judicial activism as not to leave a domain names owners without any 
protection. For example, Panavision International, Inc v. Toeppen57 demonstrated the willingness of the 
court of to respond to impact of technological inventions on business world. The Ninth Circuit, departing 
from the traditional approach, ruled that the idea of registering the domain name and attempting to sell it 
to complainant (though not using it to sell a distinct product as stipulated under the Act) was itself a 
commercial use in commerce of the trademark of the complainant.58 However, the decision in Avery 
Dennison Corp v. Jerry Sumpton59veered from the direction of earlier cases limiting the dilution cases to 
truly famous marks.  Apart from problems of conflicting decisions, there are jurisdictional challenges. It 
was difficult making the US an appropriate forum because infringements take place in the cyberspace. In 
response, the Congress passed the ACPA, codified in the Lanham Act at 15 U.S.C. §1125(d).60 
 
6.   Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) 1999 
United States is a hub of cybersquatting infringements. Statistics available from WIPO’s websites shows 
that out of 1,934 cases before WIPO in 2007, 930 cases were initiated by US resident complainants and 
841 respondents’ were also resident in the same country.61 By 7 August 2014, 485 cases had been filed in 
the US.62 The inconsistencies that were rife in US courts on how to treat cases of cybersquatting 
necessitated the enactment of the Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) in 1999. The Act 
which amended section 43 of the Trademark Act was passed to: 
 
to protect consumers and American businesses, to promote the growth of online 
commerce, and to provide clarity in the law for trademark owners by prohibiting the 
                                               
54 WIPO Case No. D2000-0156 
55 WIPO Case No. D2000-0050  
56 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C §1125(a) and (c)(1) 
57 141 F.3d 1316,1319 (9th Circuit 1998) 
58 Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1325-26 
59 189 F.3d 868 (9 Cir 1999) 
60 Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. No.106-113, §§3001-10 (1999), 113 Stat. 1501A-545 
(codified) at 15 U.S.C. §1125(d) 0. 
61  See WIPO Complainant Filing by Country: United States of America 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics/countries_yr.jsp?party=R&country_id=178  accessed 7 August 
2014  
62 Ibid  
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bad-faith63 and abusive registration of distinctive marks as Internet domain names with 
the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with such marks—a practice commonly 
referred to as “cybersquatting”. 
 
The ACPA allows a trademark owner and the owner of a personal name registered as a mark to 
sue a person who registers or uses a domain name with bad-faith intent to profit from the owner’s 
trademark or personal name.64 It outlaws registering, trafficking in or using a domain name that is 
identical to or confusingly similar to a distinctive or famous trademark. The Act prohibits the registration, 
trafficking in or using a domain name that dilutes a famous trademark. Where the trademark is merely 
distinctive when the domain is registered but not famous, it is not protected against dilution.  
Like URDP, whether the defendant had acted in bad faith is important in determining whether the 
domain name should be transferred to the plaintiff. The ACPA specifies nine nonexclusive factors to 
guide the courts in finding bad faith.65  Through a case by case analysis in finding out the actual intent of 
the registrant, the court can consider other unique instances test which may not necessarily be covered by 
the nine factors.   
The first four factors negate the finding of bad faith. The court must ask whether the registrant has 
legitimate rights in the domain name. These rights may be in form of intellectual property rights, legal 
names, prior usage and genuine non-commercial or fair use of the mark. These factors give justifications 
of instances when a defendant might have in good faith registered a domain name incorporating the mark 
of another party.66 For example, a prior agreement between business partners that defendants would 
develop and utilize web sites as a means of attracting clients to plaintiff's business would not amount to 
bad faith.67 The next four factors constitute acts of deliberate cybersquatting: (i) creating a confusion 
which could harm the goodwill of the mark; (ii) offering the domain name for sale for financial gain (iii) 
providing false information contact or registering identical or confusingly similar multiple domain names; 
and (iv) registering multiple domain names which are confusingly similar. The last factor looks at the 
feature of the mark itself.  To what extent is the mark distinctive and famous?  Registration of a more 
distinctive or famous mark by a defendant may point towards bad faith intent.  
 
6.1  Intent to Profit? 
According to the Congressional Record, “The bill is carefully and narrowly tailored…to extend only to 
cases where the plaintiff can demonstrate…bad-faith intent to profit…”68 Does it mean that the act of the 
defendant must be commercially driven? Should the court separate the phrase “bad faith intent to profit” 
into two separate elements “bad faith” and “intent to profit”?  
The decision in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Doughney69 constituted a 
broad interpretation of the meaning of “intent to profit”. For the usage of the domain name to constitute a 
commercial use, the defendant does not necessarily need to have advertised goods or services with the 
domain name.  The defendant did not advertise any goods or services but posted information and 
materials which opposed the view and purposes of PETA. When sued for service mark infringement, 
unfair competition, dilution and cybersquatting, the defendant contended that his website, (People Eating 
Tasty Animals) was a constitutionally-protected parody of PETA.  Rather than examining whether the 
defendant benefitted financially, the district court looked at the financial loss which the plaintiff might 
have suffered. The district court opined that defendant activities constituted a commercial use because it 
must have diminished the plaintiff’s clientele base. The court concluded that services included a 
dissemination of purely ideological dissemination and inferred a more substantial evidential of 
commercial use through the presence of hyperlinks to commercial operations. Surprisingly, there was no 
evidence supporting that the defendant derived any benefit from the hyperlinks to these other websites.  
The court should have directed its mind to the initial purpose of registering the domain name, that is, a 
parody of the views of PETA. However, it would not be wrong to conclude that the court was influenced 
                                               
63 Emphasis supplied  
64 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(1)(A) 
65 §1125(d)(1)(B)(i)  
66 Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F. 3d 774 - Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit 2004 
67 Eagle HOSP. Physicians v. SRG Consulting, 509 F. Supp. 2d 1337 - Dist. Court, ND Georgia 2007 
68 Senate Report  Note 9 pg 12 
69 113 F. Supp. 2d 915 - Dist. Court, ED Virginia 2000 
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by the reference of willingness to settle found on the defendant’s website.”70 In summary the respondent 
only need to have prevented users from accessing PETA's goods or services, or need only to have 
connected the website to other's goods or services.71 However, was the district court right to reject the 
parody evidence of the defendant?  A fear expressed is that ACPA may result in unconstitutional chilling 
of freedom of speech.72  The ACPA contains a safe harbour provision or a good faith provision which is 
examined below.  
On whether the plaintiff should prove “bad faith intent to profit” or either “bad faith” or “intent to 
profit”, the Eleventh Circuit in Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co.73 held that proving "bad faith" 
is not enough. A plaintiff must establish that the defendant had “bad faith intent to profit” Reading the 
words “intent to profit” out of the statute would defeat the purpose of the Act. The Act targets those who 
may want to extract payment from the rightful owners of the marks, sell the marks to the highest bidder, 
prey on consumer confusion and to defraud consumer.74 For example, a mere effort to obtain a 
cardcheck/neutrality agreement does not translate to a monetary gain hence it will not constitute “intent to 
profit.”75  
 
6.1.1  Finding Bad Faith under the ACPA 
The ACPA was first put to test in Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v Sportman’s Market, Inc.76 in a dispute over the 
ownership of the domain name “sportys.com.”  This case is of interest because the US District court 
applied the Federal Trademark Dilution Act while the Second Circuit applied ACPA. The plaintiff, 
Sportman’s, a mail order company selling aviation tools annually distributes approximately 18 million 
catalogues nationwide, and has yearly revenues of about $50 million.77 Sportsman’s claimed that it had 
used the disputed mark for forty year prior to the commencement of the case and had spent about $10 
million annually building and advertising the brand, “sporty”. It alleged that the defendant, a subsidiary of 
Omega Engineering and Pilot’s Depot (formed by Arthur Hollander) had registered sporty.com with bad 
faith intent to profit in 1995.78 The defendant contended that the purpose of registering the domain name 
was to sell Christmas trees. On how it came about the name, Ralph S. Michael, the CEO of Omega and 
manager of Sporty's Farm explained that the origin of the name derived from a childhood memory he had 
of his uncle's farm in upstate New York and that he had a dog named Spotty when he was a youngster.79  
In its decision, the lower court applying the traditional trademark infringement and dilution 
principles concluded that the defendant did not violate trademarks rights in “sportys.com” and because 
the two parties operated different kinds of businesses so there would be no likelihood of confusion.80 On 
dilution of mark, the District Court found that the term “sporty” was a famous mark deserving protection 
and Sporty’s Farm made it difficult for Sportman’s to identify and distinguish its goods on the internet.81  
On appeal, the appellate court agreed with the lower court and further highlighted the importance 
of a new legislation in tackling the problem of cybersquatting.  On whether Sporty’s Farm had acted in 
bad faith, the court concluded there was overwhelming evidence as required under the new legislation. 
The court reached the following conclusions after analysing the first four factors. First, having regard to 
the time when the domain name was registered; the court concluded that the defendants could not 
establish intellectual property rights at the time of registration.  Second, there was no correlation between 
Omega as the registrant and the disputed domain name. Third, the sudden of the domain name was 
                                               
70 Ibid at 920. This decision was affirmed on appeal. See People for Ethical Treatment/Animals v. Doughney, 263 F. 
3d 359 - Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit 2001   
71 ibid 
72 John Brogan “Much Ado About Squatting: The Constitutionally Precarious Application of the Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection  Act 88 Iowa Law Review 2002 163 – 197  
73 575 F. 3d 1235 - Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 2009  
74 Senate Report  Note 9 pp 5-6  
75 Cintas Corp. v. Unite Here 601 F. Supp. 2d 571 - Dist. Court, SD New York 2009. The District Court decision was 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 2009.  
76 202 F.3d 489 (2nd Circuit 2000) 
77 Ibid at 494 
78 In late 1994 or early 1995, the owners of Omega, Arthur and Betty Hollander, decided to enter the aviation 
catalogue business and, for that purpose, formed a wholly-owned subsidiary called Pilot's Depot, LLC ("Pilot's 
Depot"). 
79 Ibid  
80 Sporty’s Farm L.L.C v. Sportman’s Mkt Inc 1998 US Dist LEXIS 23290 at 14 
81 Ibid at 23 
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influenced by the court action. Finally, the use of the domain name by Sporty’s was “non-commercial and 
the purchase of the name was shrouded in “suspicious circumstances.82”  
Furthermore, the Second Circuit inferred actual knowledge of the existence of the brand name in 
the act of Omega owner, Arthur Hollander, who was a pilot and had received Sportman’s catalogues.  
This finding negated the childhood story of Michael because there was no evidence supporting that 
Hollander was considering starting a Christmas tree business when he registered sportys.com or that 
Hollander was ever acquainted with Michael's dog, Spotty. More evidence of bad faith was found in 
Sporty’s Farm intentions to compete with Sportman’s in the same line of business and knowing well that 
there was link between “sporty’s and Sportman’s. 
The decision of the Second Circuit in Sporty’s Farm is laudable in various ramifications.  It 
decides to widen the dragnet of ACPA by looking at the intention of the registrant not necessarily within 
the Act alone. It looks beyond the regular cybersquatters found in UDRP cases above.  
 
 
6.1.2 Is Typosquatting an act of cybersquatting? 
A claim that the act of the defendant is a mere typosquatting will not constitute a suitable defence of lack 
of bad faith.  Typosquatting or domain mimicry is a variation of cybersquatting. A typosquatter registers 
one or more internet domain names with the aim of exploiting common misspellings that a user may 
make when trying to use company’s registered trademark names. In Northern Light Technology, Inc v 
Northern Lights Club,83 the parties disputed over the ownership of “northernlights.com.”  The plaintiff 
had used the domain name “northenlight.com” as an internet search engine since 1997. Jeff Burgar a self-
described "Internet entrepreneur," registered thousands of "catchy" domain names which appropriated, in 
identical or slightly modified form, the names of popular people and organizations. As the president of 
Northern Lights Club, he claimed to have registered the disputed domain name with the intention of 
bringing together “devotees of the Northern Lights, or aurora borealis, including businesses that take 
their name from the famous celestial phenomenon”.  
Rather than serving as the forum indicated by the defendant, the association had no real members, 
instead it provided a search function on the northernlights.com site for specific words or phrases and 
created links to various businesses which included the plaintiff’s website under the "Northern Lights 
Community" without the plaintiff’s authorisation.  The plaintiff sought a restraining order modifying the 
content of the northernlights.com site to prevent further public confusion.  
The district court found for the plaintiff on its ACPA claims based on the confusing similarity of 
the two domain names and proof of defendants' bad-faith intent to profit from plaintiff's 
northernlight.com mark. However, defendants' historical practice of "targeting trademarked names, 
creating fictional entities to register them, and offering dubious explanations for the selection of these 
domain names" ultimately tipped the scales in favour of such a preliminary determination. 84  
Dismissing the appeal of the defendant, the Second Circuit Court noted that multiple registrations 
alone are not dispositive of the bad-faith issue but based on defendants' apparent modus operandi of 
registering domain names containing the famous trademarks of others in the hope that the famous 
trademark holder will be willing to pay to reclaim its intellectual-property rights fit within the 
determination of bad faith factors under ACPA. Neither the lower court nor the court of appeal addresses 
the issue of typosquatting as demonstrated in this case. 
The court was presented with another opportunity to address the problem of typosquatting in 
Shields v. Zuccarini85  where the defendants registered series of domain names which were confusingly 
similar to “Joe Cartoon” mark. The defendant contended that he was not cybersquatting rather he was 
“typosquatting and his act was not covered by ACPA.86 Rejecting the argument of the defendant, the 
court concluded that the ACPA protection extends not only the registration of domain names that are 
"identical" to distinctive or famous marks, but also to those are "confusingly similar" to distinctive or 
famous marks.87 According to the court, a reasonable interpretation of conduct covered by the phrase 
                                               
82 Ibid  
83 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001) 
84 District Court 119 
85 254 F. 3d 476,486 (3d Cir 2001) 
86 Ibid pg 484 
87 Ibid 
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"confusingly similar" is the intentional registration of domain names that are misspellings of distinctive or 
famous names, causing an Internet user who makes a slight spelling or typing error to reach an 
unintended site.88  
On the issue of bad faith intent to profit, it was led in evidence that web users were lured into 
Zuccarini’s websites and were trapped to the extent that they could only exit after they had clicked on the 
advertisements on the websites.  The court found bad faith with intent to profit not only from the revenue 
being generated from the clicks on the advert but also with the deliberate act of the defendant to mislead 
consumers.  
 
6.1.3 Good Faith v. Bad Faith 
The ACPA includes a safe harbour provision which strikes a balance between internet authors and mark 
owners. The Act excludes bad faith intent to profit where in the court opinion the person believed and had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.89 The 
Eight Circuit explained in Coca Cola v. Purdy90  that ACPA "was intended to balance the interests of 
trademark owners against the interests of those who would make fair uses of a mark online for comment, 
criticism, parody, and news reporting."91 The interest that safe harbour intends to balance does not include 
an employee or contractor who registered a domain name on behalf of his employer and was later relived 
of his employment.92  The court pre-empt a situation where a cybersquatter would put forward every 
lawful justifications for his act if the safe harbour provision is not narrowly read.93 Without doubt such a 
broad reading would not align with the intention of the Congress.  
The application of safe harbour or good faith has not been very straightforward looking at 
Northland Insurance v Blaylock94  and the case of PETA discussed above. In Northland Insurance, when 
a domain name offers a forum for criticism of a company (cybergripping) or using names such as 
“companynamesucks.com” would not amount to bad faith.  The court emphasises the importance of 
“intent to profit” and not merely bad faith from the registrant. Websites offering criticism or parody may 
be borne out of bad faith but this does not out rightly make them bad. The defendant did not seek any 
financial or commercial benefit but to inform other insurance consumers of his commercial commentary 
and criticism.95 Even where the defendant “deceived” customers to his own site, there was no discernible 
"switch".96 
Similarly in PETA the defendant had set up the website to disseminate views that are antithetical 
to that of the plaintiff. However PETA defendants website provided links to other commercially viable 
websites. The appellant contended that the rejection by the district court of attorney’s fees confirmed that 
his actions constituted parody and was protected by First Amendment. Dismissing the appeal, the 
appellate court reasoned that the appellant had no reasonable ground to believe that his act was lawful. 
The presence of commercial links vitiated any claim of any legitimate non-commercial use the defendant 
may have and more importantly the defendant’s demonstration of willingness to transfer the domain name 
for a price suggested intent to profit.  Where a defendant has acted partially in bad faith in registering a 
domain name it would not be entitled to benefit from the ACPA's safe harbour provision.97  Attempt to 
sell or actual sale and presence of commercial banners or links would deny any reliance on safe harbour 
defence.  
Application of the safe harbour provision by some courts has constituted an overzealous 
application of the ACPA. The order of analysis of the conduct of the defendant favours a finding of bad 
faith intent to profit. The factors used in assessing whether the acts of the defendant were lawful are the 
same used in analysing bad faith making the safe harbour provision lacks any independence from the 
                                               
88 Ibid pg 485 
89 15 U.S.C. s1125(B)(ii) 
90 382 F3d 774 (8th Cir. 2004)  
91 ibid at 778; See also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentstcks.com, 95 F.Supp.2d 528,535 (E.D.Va. 2000) 
92 DSPT International v Lucky Nahum  (9th Circuit Oct  27, 2010) 
93 238 F. 3d 264 (4th Circuit 2001) 
94 115 F.Supp. 2d 1108 (D.Minn 2000) 
95 See also Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1168 (C.D.Cal.1998)  
96 ibid 
97 Supra Note 69 
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ACPA.98  Such approach relegates the importance of the parody and other secondary acts are given 
prominence. For example in Toronto-Dominion Bank v Karpachev,99 the defendant criticised the 
plaintiff’s organisation on 16 domain names typosquatting the plaintiff’s actual domain name. The 
defendant also made strong allegation of ‘white collar crime’ and likened the plaintiffs’ business methods 
to ‘Nazi or Soviet Totalitarists.’100 There was no evidence that Karpachev attempted to sell the domain 
names to plaintiff, and it was not proved that the domain was used in connection with the offering of 
goods or services. The court gave regard to the defendant’s intention to divert consumers and registration 
of multiple domain names. Despite the fact that the content of the site constitute complaints about 
plaintiff’s business practices, the use of the domain names was held not to be a “fair use.” It is appropriate 
to conclude the content of vilification played a significant role in the court’s finding however this 
decision conflicts with the holding of the court in Northland Insurance Companies v. Blaylock above and 
Marianne Bihari and Bihari Interiors, Inc. v. Craig Ross and Yolanda Truglio.101 So a griper must ensure 
that content of his criticism are directly related to the business of the defendant or acts being complained 
about and not just a blanket disparaging remark.   
It appears that the ACPA covers instances of coincident registration. Coincidence here includes a 
reasonable belief that registration was carried without awareness of the existing mark. The Senate report 
states that “… The bill does not extent (sic) to innocent domain name registrations by those who are 
unaware of another’s use of the name.”102 Therefore innocent infringement predicated on a person’s 
ignorance of a third party superior right to the mark incurs no liability. 
 
7.0 Conclusion 
The last fifteen years of both UDRP and ACPA have been preoccupied with plethora of cases 
adjudicating the ownership of domain names in bad faith. This however has not abated the threat of 
cybersquatting to business identities considering the statistics obtained from WIPO alone. Both 
instruments examined have reasonably targeted registrations done in bad faith by providing appropriate 
guidelines to the court and the panels. The discretion allowed by these instruments makes it easy to 
circumscribe instances not enumerated within the guidelines as bad faith. As laudable as this may be, 
certain contours especially the areas of intent to profit and safe harbour provisions would still need to be 
addressed. The URDP starkly leaves a genuine griper without any remedy and it is imperative under the 
ACPA to cautiously carve the interpretation be given safe harbour provisions.  
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